Revenue is up 32.3% year on year. Ad spend is up faster. This audit shows exactly where the money is falling through the cracks – missing negations, unrevised bids, unfunded winners – and what disciplined weekly management recovers before Q4.
Most audits open by telling you your account is broken. This one does not, because it is not true. Elizo grew 32.3% year on year, conversion has risen for five straight months, and June – the second-strongest month on record, with a genuine Father’s Day effect visible in the daily pattern – proves the growth is real. The problem is narrower and more expensive than a bad strategy: the account gets rescued when something visibly fails, but it never gets optimised.
1. The business is growing strongly. Revenue rose from $318,873 to $421,961 year on year – up 32.3% – and units rose 57.1%, from 6,020 to 9,459. June was the second-strongest month in the twelve-month record, up 34.8% in revenue on June 2025 alone, with a real Father’s Day spike visible in the daily pattern of both years – see section 01.
2. Advertising is growing faster than sales. Ad spend reached $107,858 against $421,961 of revenue – a TACoS of 25.6%. Only 32.1% of revenue now arrives without paid support. Growth is real, and an increasing share of it is being bought.
3. When something visibly fails, it does get switched off. Eleven campaigns are currently paused – almost all of them Wallet, Portfolio and Journal – after spending $15,033 at a blended 61.0% ACOS. That is genuine intervention, and it is the reason this is not a story about neglect.
4. But between those interventions nothing is maintained. 50 targets are still enabled having produced zero orders in their lifetime across 1,451 clicks. Six of them alone carry $178 in spend and 169 clicks with nothing to show for it. Search terms with over a hundred clicks and no sales have never been negated.
5. And the winners are never scaled. Bible Cover returns 3.47× at 19.7% total ACOS and is funded below its contribution, while Portfolio, Wallet and Journal take 20.4% of spend to produce 13.8% of revenue.
It matters that we establish both halves of this first. The findings in this document are expensive precisely because the underlying business is strong – and urgent because the paid layer is growing faster than the revenue it supports.
Revenue up 32.3% and units up 57.1% year on year is genuinely strong performance, and no part of this audit disputes it.
But units grew almost twice as fast as revenue, which means average order value fell – and with TACoS at 25.6% and organic share at 32.1%, the account is buying a larger portion of its own growth than it did a year ago.
That is not a crisis. It is the point at which efficiency work stops being optional, because every further point of TACoS comes directly out of margin.
| Month | Revenue | Units | Sessions | Account CVR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 2025 | $155,019 | 3,080 | 34,658* | — |
| Aug 2025 | $164,860 | 3,301 | 87,642 | 3.77% |
| Sep 2025 | $142,153 | 2,646 | 73,943 | 3.58% |
| Oct 2025 | $163,128 | 3,126 | 86,560 | 3.61% |
| Nov 2025 | $218,621 | 4,247 | 109,147 | 3.89% |
| Dec 2025 Peak | $486,917 | 9,140 | 169,739 | 5.38% |
| Jan 2026 | $175,072 | 3,642 | 90,910 | 4.01% |
| Feb 2026 | $144,931 | 2,962 | 67,671 | 4.38% |
| Mar 2026 | $162,411 | 3,376 | 75,657 | 4.46% |
| Apr 2026 | $137,919 | 3,210 | 65,764 | 4.88% |
| May 2026 | $189,805 | 4,280 | 84,715 | 5.05% |
| Jun 2026 +22.3% | $232,156 | 5,179 | 97,518 | 5.31% |
| Jul 2026 (to 20 Jul) | $112,178 | 2,465 | 41,144 | 5.99% |
*July 2025 session counts appear under-reported relative to every later month; the conversion rate for that month is excluded as not comparable. July 2026 is a partial month, shown for pace only.
Revenue rose 22.3% from May to June, and July is pacing roughly 15% ahead of last July on daily run-rate – $112,178 through 20 July against $155,019 for the whole of July 2025.
Quieter, and just as important: account conversion has now improved for five consecutive months – 4.01% in January to 5.31% in June, still climbing at 5.99% in July to date. Whatever is being done on the product and listing side is working. The paid layer is the part that has not kept up. This growth trend is real and independent of any single date on the calendar.
Layered on top of it, the daily sales pattern shows a genuine Father’s Day effect. Units ordered spiked in the days leading into 21 June 2026, and the same shape appears the year before, shifted by exactly the number of days Father’s Day itself shifted – a smaller peak leading into 15 June 2025. That is not a coincidence in one year’s data; it is the same pattern recurring on the correct date two years running.
June alone was up 34.8% in revenue and 58.5% in units year on year – in line with the account’s broader growth rate, not dramatically above it. Both things Elizo has observed are true: Father’s Day is a real, visible driver, and June’s underlying strength does not depend on it.
The account already has five dedicated campaigns built for this occasion – covering Desk Pad, Toiletry Bags, Bible Covers, Knife Rolls, and a general Father’s Day campaign. Someone on this account correctly identified the opportunity. Confirmed spend on those campaigns in June: $23.
Separately, across the account’s full search-term history, only 62 queries mention father, dad, husband, or a gift-for-him intent – totalling $78 in spend and 8 orders, almost all landing as one-click incidental matches inside other campaigns rather than the dedicated ones built to capture them. Between the two, real investment in this occasion is close to nothing.
The daily sales spike in section 01 is real. It happened almost entirely on organic demand and general merchandising – not on the paid infrastructure already built for exactly this purpose. For a catalogue this well matched to Father’s Day – wallets, chef knife rolls, personalised leather, desk gifts – $23 is not a light-touch campaign. It is barely a test.
This is the single largest finding in the audit, and it is confirmed independently by two different datasets – an ASIN-level join of the business report against the advertised-product report, and the campaign portfolio view. Both arrive at the same answer.
| Product Line | Revenue | Rev % | Ad Spend | Spend % | Index | Total ACOS | CVR | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Desk Pad | $130,881 | 31.0% | $31,441 | 31.2% | 1.01× | 24.0% | 6.5% | Balanced |
| Bible Cover | $112,389 | 26.6% | $22,092 | 21.9% | 0.82× | 19.7% | 4.9% | Under-funded |
| Knife Roll | $93,870 | 22.2% | $19,167 | 19.0% | 0.86× | 20.4% | 7.1% | Slightly under |
| Portfolio Over | $30,548 | 7.2% | $11,211 | 11.1% | 1.54× | 36.7% | 2.3% | Over-funded |
| Toiletry Bag | $26,039 | 6.2% | $7,479 | 7.4% | 1.20× | 28.7% | 5.2% | Balanced |
| Wallet Over | $20,887 | 4.9% | $6,946 | 6.9% | 1.39× | 33.3% | 4.1% | Over-funded |
| Journal Over | $6,977 | 1.7% | $2,435 | 2.4% | 1.46× | 34.9% | 5.7% | Over-funded |
| Account | $421,961 | 100% | $107,858 | 100% | — | 25.6% | 5.2% |
Index = share of ad spend divided by share of total revenue. Above 1.25× means a line consumes materially more budget than its contribution justifies; below 0.85× means it is funded below what it earns. Total ACOS = ad spend divided by that line’s full business-report revenue, not ad-attributed sales – the honest measure of what advertising costs against what the line actually sells. Revenue from the child-item report; spend from the campaign export covering 93.4% of account spend.
Portfolio, Wallet and Journal together consume $20,592 in ad spend against $58,412 of revenue. Their total ACOS runs between 33.3% and 36.7% – against an account average of 25.6% and a Bible Cover figure of 19.7%.
Portfolio is the clearest case: 11.1% of budget for 7.2% of revenue, at a 2.3% conversion rate against 7.1% on Knife Roll. This is not a bidding problem, and section 08 sets out why.
Over the same window Bible Cover took 21.9% of spend to deliver 26.6% of revenue at the lowest total ACOS of any line in the account – and December data shows it is also the single largest contributor to the Q4 peak.
Everything in section 02 raises an obvious question: how does a competently built, fast-growing account end up funding its weakest lines above its strongest? The answer is not neglect – someone is clearly watching. It is that intervention only happens when something visibly breaks, and nothing happens in between.
Eleven campaigns are currently paused, having spent $15,033 at a blended 61.0% ACOS before being switched off. They are almost entirely the weakest lines – three Long Wallets campaigns, four Portfolio, two Journal, one Toiletry video.
That is a correct decision, made deliberately. Any audit claiming this account is abandoned would be wrong, and we are not going to make that claim.
Across the twenty targets carrying the highest ACOS in the account, $2,205 of spend produced $2,097 of sales – a blended 105.1% ACOS. Twelve of the twenty are individually above 100%, meaning they lose money before cost of goods, fees or returns are counted.
Measured against a 30% target ACOS – the benchmark we would recommend for this account, and one the strongest lines already beat at 27.6% and 29.4% – that same $2,097 of sales should have cost $629. It cost $2,205.
None of these targets are new. Every one has accumulated enough click volume for the result to be established rather than uncertain.
| What was found | Scale | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Top 20 targets at 105.1% ACOS | $1,576 over target | No bid ceiling enforced |
| Active targets with zero lifetime orders | 50 targets · $1,577 | No weekly target review |
| Six zero-order targets, highest bids | $178 spend · 169 clicks | Bids never revisited despite the result |
| Search terms, 100+ clicks, zero orders | Still running | No search-term or negation review |
| Off-Amazon placement | 163.5% ACOS | A one-click fix nobody made |
| Last meaningful bid optimisation | 26 June | 24 days before this audit |
This account does not benchmark against Amazon’s suggested bid, and it shouldn’t – that figure is frequently a poor fit for a specific account’s real economics. The problem here is not the bid level in isolation; it is that these bids were set once and never revisited against what actually happened next.
| Target | Bid | Clicks | Spend | Orders |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| leather cover for bible | $3.72 | 44 | $59.95 | 0 |
| complements (Portfolio A5) | $0.72 | 55 | $41.00 | 0 |
| complements (Portfolio A5) | $1.15 | 20 | $19.78 | 0 |
| leather knife roll bags for chefs | $1.23 | 20 | $30.90 | 0 |
| complements (Portfolio A5) | $1.34 | 11 | $16.12 | 0 |
| asin-expanded B0BXHL5M53 | $0.57 | 19 | $10.71 | 0 |
| Total | — | 169 | $178.46 | 0 |
Six targets, 169 clicks, zero orders between them. The bid itself was never the failure – the absence of a review after the clicks kept coming in with no return is.
Across their entire lifetime, 50 currently-enabled targets in currently-enabled campaigns have accumulated 363,744 impressions, 1,451 clicks and $1,577 in spend – against zero orders.
Sixteen of these have taken 25 or more clicks with no conversion. At that click volume, the result is no longer uncertain; it is established. They should have been paused months ago.
Broad match accounts for 43% of this waste, and the Wallet and Portfolio lines are heavily represented – the same lines identified in section 02.
Campaign history shows Desk Pad – Defence (3.21× ROAS) and Knife Roll – Broad (3.74× ROAS) moving to Paused at 16 July 22:57 and returning to Delivering at 18 July 13:11 – identical timestamps on both. Two shorter outages occurred on 2 and 3 July.
These campaigns were running at 30–52% of their daily budget, so this was not budget exhaustion. Estimated cost of the July 16–18 outage across these two campaigns alone is approximately $1,190 in lost sales.
We are not yet able to state the cause. The pattern – sporadic, simultaneous across campaigns, variable duration – is consistent with an account-level event such as a billing interruption or a bulk manual action. It is not consistent with a dayparting rule, which would show a nightly cadence. Confirming this is a week-one task, not a conclusion we will assert without evidence.
There is nothing structurally wrong with how this account is built. Sponsored Brands Video is the strongest format running, one entire channel is missing, and across fifty campaigns the account holds almost no share of the position that converts best.
| Campaign Type | Campaigns | Spend | % Spend | Ad Sales | ACOS | ROAS | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sponsored Products | 38 | $68,856 | 68.3% | $183,627 | 37.5% | 2.67× | The account’s base |
| Sponsored Brands Video Best | 11 | $26,972 | 26.8% | $78,952 | 34.2% | 2.93× | Strongest format |
| Sponsored Brands (banner) | 1 | $4,943 | 4.9% | $9,436 | 52.4% | 1.91× | Single weak campaign |
| Sponsored Display | 0 | — | 0% | — | — | — | Channel absent |
| Total | 50 | $100,772 | 100% | $272,014 | 37.0% | 2.70× |
Campaign export covers the fifty largest campaigns – $100,772 of the $107,858 total, or 93.4% of account spend.
Sponsored Brands Video runs at 34.2% ACOS and 2.93× across eleven campaigns – better than Sponsored Products on both measures, and the two strongest individual campaigns in the account are both video: Bible Case Antique – Video at 28.8% ACOS and Knife Roll – Video at 26.2%.
The single non-video Sponsored Brands campaign, Desk pad – SB banner, runs at 52.4% ACOS and 1.91× on $4,943 of spend. Same format family, opposite outcome – the creative type is doing the work, not the placement.
It would be easy to read the waste in this account and conclude that broad match is too loose, then tighten it everywhere. That would be the wrong correction.
The largest broad campaigns in the account are among its best performers – Knife Roll – Broad at 30.1% ACOS and Bible Case Antique – Broad at 32.6%, together carrying $13,400 of spend at above 3.0×. Broad is working where the product converts.
The bleed is broad match running without negation into the Wallet and Portfolio lines – which do not convert on any targeting method. Section 06 shows Wallet queries taking 322 clicks and zero orders. Restricting broad account-wide would throttle the account’s strongest campaigns to solve a problem they did not cause.
Placement reporting was available for $56,212 of spend – 52% of the account – at the time of writing. The figures below are therefore directional rather than complete, and we have not attached a dollar projection to them.
| Placement | % Spend | Spend | Sales | ACOS | CVR | ROAS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Product Pages | 36.8% | $20.66K | $46.21K | 44.7% | 4.8% | 2.24× |
| Rest of Search | 36.0% | $20.21K | $51.35K | 39.3% | 4.9% | 2.54× |
| Top of Search | 24.9% | $13.97K | $48.78K | 28.6% | 8.6% | 3.49× |
| Business Best | 2.0% | $1.11K | $5.90K | 18.7% | 10.7% | 5.33× |
| Off Amazon | 0.5% | $262 | $160 | 163.5% | 0.5% | 0.61× |
Within the campaigns we can see, Product Pages converts at 4.8% and returns 2.24×. Top of Search converts at 8.6% and returns 3.49× – yet receives twelve percentage points less of the budget.
This is a reallocation call, not a bet on winning more auctions in a competitive field. The campaigns already bid into Top of Search; the question is how much of the existing spend is weighted toward the placement that already converts better.
Within the visible campaigns, Business placement returns 5.33× at 18.7% ACOS with 10.7% conversion – the strongest performance of any placement, better than Top of Search on every measure. It receives 2.0% of the spend we can see.
For a premium leather brand selling desk pads, portfolios, journals and toiletry bags, a strong B2B signal is not surprising – these are corporate gifting products. That matters considerably heading into Q4.
Search-term data is where the absence of weekly management becomes most visible. Terms converting at fifteen and sixteen times return carry double-digit budgets, while terms with a hundred clicks and no orders continue to spend.
| Search Term | Spend | Sales | CVR | ACOS | ROAS | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| leather bible cover | $133 | $2,190 | 32.0% | 6.0% | 16.54× | Scale aggressively |
| b0brth7y23 | $128 | $1,920 | 28.7% | 6.7% | 14.98× | Scale aggressively |
| knife roll | $198 | $2,190 | 28.6% | 9.1% | 11.05× | Scale |
| knife roll bag | $219 | $1,960 | 30.3% | 11.2% | 8.94× | Scale |
| b0bdj9lgj8 | $404 | $2,710 | 10.1% | 14.9% | 6.72× | Scale |
| mens leather toiletry bag | $498 | $2,210 | 11.3% | 22.5% | 4.44× | Hold & monitor |
| Search Term | Spend | Clicks | Orders | Line | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| bible cover case for women | $128 | 122 | 0 | Bible | Negate exact |
| b0bwgwknjy | $72 | 58 | 0 | ASIN | Negate |
| ariat wallet for men | $68 | 109 | 0 | Wallet | Negate phrase |
| wallets for men | $68 | 113 | 0 | Wallet | Negate phrase |
| knife bag roll | $61 | 40 | 0 | Knife | Reduce bid, watch 14d |
| computer desk mat | $55 | 41 | 0 | Desk Pad | Reduce bid, watch 14d |
| western wallet | $54 | 100 | 0 | Wallet | Negate phrase |
| leather folio | $50 | 47 | 0 | Portfolio | Negate phrase |
| portfolio binder | $44 | 70 | 0 | Portfolio | Negate phrase |
| mens office decor | $40 | 35 | 0 | Generic | Negate phrase |
Three of the ten highest-spending zero-order search terms are Wallet queries, taking 322 clicks and $190 in spend without a single order. Two more are Portfolio terms.
This is the same conclusion reached in section 02 from the portfolio data, and in the ASIN-level catalogue join, and in the zero-order target export. Four datasets, four methods, one answer.
Across the audit window, 44 ASINs generated revenue without appearing in any advertised-product report. Together they account for 13.0% of total sales – and several convert better than the products currently receiving budget. We understand from the account team that low inventory is the reason most of these are not advertised. That is the correct call today – which turns this section from a launch list into a restock priority list.
| ASIN | Product | Revenue | Sessions | CVR | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B0GPS751HP | Full Grain Leather Bible Cover for Women | $2,099 | 355 | 9.9% | First, once stocked |
| B0GH3G1QRS | Leather Bible Cover | $2,250 | 536 | 8.4% | First, once stocked |
| B0GPT632RG | Full Grain Leather Bible Cover for Women | $1,859 | 385 | 8.1% | First, once stocked |
| B0GPM4CDZP | Real Leather Desk Mat Set (24×14) | $1,766 | 722 | 7.2% | First, once stocked |
| B0GPM4RJRL | Leather Desk Pad | $4,424 | 1,045 | 7.0% | First, once stocked |
| B0GPSQX8GJ | Leather Bible Cover | $1,439 | 345 | 7.0% | First, once stocked |
| B0CJVR567J | Long Wallet – Western | $1,877 | 1,704 | 5.5% | Phase 2 |
| B0GH8ZP4DL | Leather Bible Cover | $1,750 | 650 | 5.4% | Phase 2 |
| B0FK6BBDFT | Premium Leather Toiletry Bag | $1,294 | 750 | 5.3% | Phase 2 |
| B0FK6C72R8 | Leather Bible Cover | $2,239 | 844 | 4.9% | Phase 2 |
| B0D9WJXSTX | Knife Roll Bag | $3,848 | 1,720 | 4.4% | Phase 2 |
| B0DJDDW5LB | Personalised Custom Desk Pad Set | $4,405 | 3,835 | 1.1% | Do not fund |
| B0DJDCMZBH | Personalised Full Grain Leather | $3,844 | 2,218 | 1.7% | Do not fund |
These ASINs are not unadvertised through oversight. Stock on most of them is thin, and advertising was withheld for that reason. That is the correct discipline – paid traffic into a listing that then stocks out burns budget building rank that is lost the moment the listing goes dark, and the recovery costs more than the launch.
But the discipline currently only runs in one direction: ads are held back when stock is low. Nothing feeds the other way – the products proving they deserve stock are not being restocked on that evidence. A 9.9%-converting bible cover with 355 sessions is exactly the product an inventory plan should prioritise, and it is sitting unstocked while three lines convert at 2–4% on full ad support.
The personalised Desk Pad and Full Grain products draw meaningful organic traffic – over six thousand sessions between them – and convert at close to one percent. They currently receive no ad spend, which is the correct decision.
Personalisation typically carries longer consideration cycles and higher price points, so a lower conversion rate is expected. But at this level the traffic is being wasted, and it is worth understanding whether the listings set the wrong expectation before any budget is considered.
This is the section where we tell you what advertising cannot do. The Portfolio line converts at 2.3% while Knife Roll converts at 7.1% – same brand, same shopper, same shelf. No bid adjustment, keyword strategy, placement multiplier or budget increase changes that number.
| Line | CVR | Total ACOS | Ad Spend | Revenue | Diagnosis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Knife Roll | 7.1% | 20.4% | $19,167 | $93,870 | Healthy – scale |
| Desk Pad | 6.5% | 24.0% | $31,441 | $130,881 | Healthy – hold |
| Journal | 5.7% | 34.9% | $2,435 | $6,977 | Targeting problem |
| Toiletry Bag | 5.2% | 28.7% | $7,479 | $26,039 | Seasonal – see §10 |
| Bible Cover | 4.9% | 19.7% | $22,092 | $112,389 | Most efficient – scale |
| Wallet | 4.1% | 33.3% | $6,946 | $20,887 | Structural |
| Portfolio | 2.3% | 36.7% | $11,211 | $30,548 | Product problem |
CVR and revenue from the child-item business report; spend from the campaign export. Note the distinction the table draws: Journal converts adequately at 5.7% but runs a 34.9% total ACOS – a targeting and bidding problem advertising work can fix. Portfolio converts at 2.3% regardless of targeting – a product problem it cannot.
Three lines – Portfolio, Wallet and Journal – are consuming $20,592 at 33–37% total ACOS, against 19.7–20.4% on your two strongest lines. There are exactly two responses, and the right one depends on commercial context we do not have. We will state our recommendation clearly, then execute whichever you choose.
Across every dataset reviewed for this audit – business reports, advertising console, campaign structure, listing pages – there is no evidence of an active coupon, deal, or promotional badge. For a catalogue whose December revenue is 2.62 times a normal month, that is a significant omission.
December lift varies enormously by line, and it varies in a pattern. The lines that spike hardest are the ones bought for someone else.
| Line | December Revenue | % of December | Seasonal Lift | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Toiletry Bag | $60,627 | 13.6% | 9.52× | Pure gift SKU |
| Journal | $14,586 | 3.3% | 3.81× | Gift-led |
| Portfolio | $21,357 | 4.8% | 3.48× | Gift-led |
| Bible Cover | $134,096 | 30.0% | 3.40× | Gift-led, largest |
| Knife Roll | $84,736 | 18.9% | 2.96× | Gift-led |
| Wallet | $23,330 | 5.2% | 2.77× | Gift-led |
| Desk Pad | $105,113 | 23.5% | 1.51× | Everyday base |
Line-level December figures are from the monthly child-item report, which captures roughly 92% of December’s $486,917 account total – some ASINs since delisted are not broken out. Shares and lift ratios are computed within that single dataset, so the comparison between lines holds.
This is the argument for acting now rather than in the autumn. December generates 2.62 times a normal month for this catalogue – and the single largest contributor to that month is also the most under-funded line in the account.
Organic rank built in August through October is what converts in November and December. Amazon’s algorithm responds to sustained conversion signals over weeks, not days.
This audit is delivered on 20 July. That leaves a genuine window to build rank on Bible Cover and Knife Roll before the season, but it is not a wide one. Every week of continued misallocation is a week of Q4 rank not being built.
We are explicit in section 11 that some of this year’s Q4 is already constrained. Starting now recovers much of it. Starting in September recovers considerably less.
The Toiletry Bag line lifts 9.52× in December and has exactly one Q4 on record, having launched in November 2025. It went from no trading history to $60,627 in a single month.
If inventory planning for this line is based on its non-seasonal run rate, a December stockout is likely. That would be the single most costly outcome available to this account – more expensive than every advertising inefficiency in this document combined.
Stock is already the binding constraint elsewhere in this catalogue – section 07’s best-converting ASINs are held out of advertising today because inventory is thin. The same purchasing plan that restocks those should size the Q4 buy on the high-lift lines, with September as the landing deadline.
This is outside advertising and we do not hold stock positions. We raise it because the data makes it visible and it would be negligent not to.
The projections below are derived from the specific reallocation models in sections 02, 05 and 08 – not from generic improvement assumptions. Where a number is uncertain we have given a range, and where an outcome is not achievable we have said so.
| Metric | Current | Month 1 | Month 3 | Month 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blended ACOS | 37.6% | 34–36% | 31–34% | 29–32% |
| TACoS | 25.6% | 23.5–25% | 20–23% | 19–21% |
| Monthly revenue | ~$211K | $205–220K | $220–240K | $235–260K |
| Organic share | 32.1% | 32–34% | 34–37% | 37–40% |
| Channels live | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 |
Month 6 falls in January 2027 and excludes the Q4 peak, which is modelled separately once the reallocation is proven. Revenue baseline is the May–June monthly average of $210,981, from a Sales Dashboard-reconciled total of $421,961.
Week one is deliberately unglamorous. It is waste removal and switching on systems that already exist. The reallocation and growth work follows once the account is clean enough to measure accurately.
Every finding in this audit traces back to the same root cause: no regular hand on the account. The remedy is not a cleverer strategy. It is showing up every week and doing the unglamorous work.
| Frequency | What happens | Why it matters here |
|---|---|---|
| Daily | Bid monitoring, anomaly flags, campaign delivery check | A 38-hour outage would be caught within hours |
| Weekly | Search-term audit, negation pass, bid review against the ACOS ceiling | Prevents the drift that produced 50 dead targets |
| Weekly | Written summary – metrics plus one paragraph on what moved and why | No dashboards, no video, no vanity numbers |
| Bi-weekly | 30-minute call with pre-read circulated in advance | Decisions made with data already reviewed |
| Monthly | Full close – ACOS, TACoS, CVR, revenue against the plan in section 11 | Measured against the numbers in this document |
| Quarterly | Strategic review and revised 90-day targets | Q4 planning begins in August, not October |
Elizo is growing – 32.3% year on year, with June the second-strongest month on record – and it holds assets most accounts do not: a proven 2.62× seasonal peak, and two product lines running below 21% total ACOS that have never been funded to their contribution. Nothing here needs rescuing. What the account has lacked is the weekly work between rescues: negating waste, re-basing bids, scaling winners, and noticing when the two best campaigns switch off for thirty-eight hours. The plan in this document redeploys roughly $10,000 per sixty days from lines running above 33% total ACOS into lines running below 21%, and does it before the Q4 window – because rank built in August converts in December. We will not promise a transformed account in thirty days. We will promise that it is maintained, measured, and reported honestly every week from the first one.
Ready to start – let’s schedule the kickoff call